When and why do rising great powers challenge or support their relatively declining peers? Given China's rise, the ostensible decline of the United States, and a long-standing debate over when and why power transitions lead to international instability, few questions are more salient to theory and contemporary security debates.
My first book and a series of accompanying articles intervene in these discussions, with widespread implications for policy and theory. |
Rising Titans, Falling Giants: How Great Powers Exploit Power Shifts
(Cornell University Press, 2018)

Inspired by contemporary debates, my first book addresses a key puzzle in IR theory and diplomatic history: why do some rising states look to further weaken their declining peers, whereas others adopt supportive policies to slow or stop others' declines?
Prominent scholarly and policy arguments hold rising states become more predatory and assertive as their relative power grows. In contrast, I find that rising state strategy depends on whether a declining state's continuation as a great power helps or hinders a rising state's security. All things being equal, the more a rising state needs partners against other threats, and the more a declining state can assist against these challenges, the more rising states support declining peers. In contrast, only when a declining state is itself a major threat to a rising state do rising states look to weaken and undermine relative decliners. Counterintuitively, even rising states that have the ability to challenge other actors may (often) forego such steps.
Drawing on extensive historical research - including thousands of archival documents - the books shows how the theory outperforms competing arguments to explain (1) the US and Soviet response to Great Britain's post-war decline, (2) American strategy vis-a-vis the USSR's decline in the late Cold War, and (3) the policies adopted by Britain, Russia, and Germany as both Austria and France declined before 1914. To supplement the evolving archival record, I also interviewed over 50 policymakers involved in shaping U.S.-Soviet relations in the late Cold War, including such senior officials as National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and Secretary of State George Shultz.
Since its publication, the book has been reviewed in several venues, including:
Foreign Affairs
H-Diplo (Roundtable)
International Affairs
Strategic Studies Quarterly
The Federalist
Russia Reviewed
Journal of East Asian Studies (forthcoming)
Texas National Security Review (forthcoming)
Prominent scholarly and policy arguments hold rising states become more predatory and assertive as their relative power grows. In contrast, I find that rising state strategy depends on whether a declining state's continuation as a great power helps or hinders a rising state's security. All things being equal, the more a rising state needs partners against other threats, and the more a declining state can assist against these challenges, the more rising states support declining peers. In contrast, only when a declining state is itself a major threat to a rising state do rising states look to weaken and undermine relative decliners. Counterintuitively, even rising states that have the ability to challenge other actors may (often) forego such steps.
Drawing on extensive historical research - including thousands of archival documents - the books shows how the theory outperforms competing arguments to explain (1) the US and Soviet response to Great Britain's post-war decline, (2) American strategy vis-a-vis the USSR's decline in the late Cold War, and (3) the policies adopted by Britain, Russia, and Germany as both Austria and France declined before 1914. To supplement the evolving archival record, I also interviewed over 50 policymakers involved in shaping U.S.-Soviet relations in the late Cold War, including such senior officials as National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and Secretary of State George Shultz.
Since its publication, the book has been reviewed in several venues, including:
Foreign Affairs
H-Diplo (Roundtable)
International Affairs
Strategic Studies Quarterly
The Federalist
Russia Reviewed
Journal of East Asian Studies (forthcoming)
Texas National Security Review (forthcoming)
Extending the Power Shift Research Program
My work on the international politics of great power rise and decline engages a broader literature on power shifts and power transitions. Thus, in addition to the book, I have an article in International Security summarizing core claims, providing additional historical evidence, and offering insights for discussions of China's rise and American decline.
I also have a chapter in the Oxford Handbook of Grand Strategy analyzing rising state grand strategy. This piece identifies common themes in the study of rising state strategy, offers new analytic frameworks, and suggests avenues for future research.
I also have a chapter in the Oxford Handbook of Grand Strategy analyzing rising state grand strategy. This piece identifies common themes in the study of rising state strategy, offers new analytic frameworks, and suggests avenues for future research.
Engaging the Debate over China's Rise and American Decline

Of course, we also live in a period where debates over the decline of the United States and accompanying rise of China are at the fore of policy and scholarly discussions. Applying insights developed in my book and IS article, pieces in the Journal of Strategic Studies and The Washington Quarterly analyze trends in the contemporary balance of power and their implications for U.S. policy.
Similarly, a working paper with Jennifer Lind examines U.S. efforts to abet China's rise, as part of a broader study of when states help the growth of new great powers.
Similarly, a working paper with Jennifer Lind examines U.S. efforts to abet China's rise, as part of a broader study of when states help the growth of new great powers.