The Security Paradox (new book project)
Building on themes in my first book and research into U.S. foreign policy after the Cold War, a new, major research project investigates (1) the strategies adopted by (broadly) secure states in world politics such as the post-Cold War U.S., and (2) why such secure actors often embrace foreign policies that harm their privileged geopolitical position. This work is driven by an unaddressed theme in policy and scholarly discussions: although states are often motivated to seek security in the face of external threats – with their efforts to gain security generating problems such as insecurity spirals and war – virtually no research examines how states behave once they gain a large measure of security.
I argue that security can, paradoxically, be as pernicious for states as insecurity by increasing the likelihood that strategists misjudge international threats and opportunities while undercutting domestic cohesion and strategic focus. In support of this argument, I am undertaking cutting-edge archival work into the foreign policies pursued by the United States – as the most secure state in history – after the Cold War and comparing the results to the behavior and pathologies of other highly secure actors such as Britain after the Napoleonic Wars and imperial Rome.
Some preliminary empirical and theoretical findings have already begun to appear. For example, an article in the Journal of Strategic Studies showcases the United States' push to suppress the European Union by enlarging NATO in a misguided effort to keep the EU from challenging the United States. Similarly, a forthcoming piece in Perspectives on Politics with John Schuessler and David Blagden underlines why some secure states are tempted (and often encouraged) to intervene abroad. Further work is ongoing.
I argue that security can, paradoxically, be as pernicious for states as insecurity by increasing the likelihood that strategists misjudge international threats and opportunities while undercutting domestic cohesion and strategic focus. In support of this argument, I am undertaking cutting-edge archival work into the foreign policies pursued by the United States – as the most secure state in history – after the Cold War and comparing the results to the behavior and pathologies of other highly secure actors such as Britain after the Napoleonic Wars and imperial Rome.
Some preliminary empirical and theoretical findings have already begun to appear. For example, an article in the Journal of Strategic Studies showcases the United States' push to suppress the European Union by enlarging NATO in a misguided effort to keep the EU from challenging the United States. Similarly, a forthcoming piece in Perspectives on Politics with John Schuessler and David Blagden underlines why some secure states are tempted (and often encouraged) to intervene abroad. Further work is ongoing.
